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Comparatively recent scholarship suggests that George Berkeley cannot be seen solely or even chiefly as a British empiricist who is reacting to the materialistic implications of Locke’s Essay on Human Understanding. C.J. McCracken has shown how Berkeley is influenced by Malebranche’s theses concerning the dependence of bodies on God, without himself doubting the evidence of the senses. McCracken also shows how Berkeley reconstructs and reapplies Malebranche’s fideism.​[1]​ Harry Bracken has argued, most notably, that Berkeley espouses certain theses that set him out as an Irish Cartesian. Like Descartes, he takes the challenge of scepticism with regard to sense-experience seriously. He sees experience in general as made up of perceivers and the perceived, with the latter being ontologically dependent on minds. Minds are active and creative substances. They cannot be understood in materialist terms, and are in fact immaterial and immortal. The ultimate mind is God’s, and the divine intellect is responsible for the totality of ideas and notions in their existence, content and structure.​[2]​ 
	In this essay I want to suggest, following my title, that Berkeley can also be regarded as a proto-phenomenologist. The term phenomenology will be understood chiefly, though not exclusively, in terms of the approach of Edmund Husserl. It has been argued in at least one study that Husserl’s transcendental philosophy is proximate to Berkeley’s supposed subjective idealism, for all of Husserl’s protestations to the contrary.​[3]​ A parallel is only drawn between the two at Berkeley’s expense. What I hope to show, by contrast, are the positive ways in which he anticipates ideas propounded by Husserl and other phenomenologists. In so doing I do not wish to fall into a hasty assimilation of the more recent thinkers to the earlier one, for there remain serious differences between them, most notably in the tasks they set themselves. 
Programmatically, Berkeley is concerned with the vindication of belief in God and the Christian faith, and the phenomenologists with uncovering the structures of consciousness in general or of human existence in particular. More detailed differences concern our grasp of generality, our perception of worldly things as meaningful wholes, and our perception of other people. But accepting all this, Berkeley is attentive to the correct use of significations in philosophical exposition, the subjective character of experience, the motility of the perceiver and the transcendence of things. Like the later thinkers, he rejects materialism, naturalism and scepticism. More importantly, he seeks to preserve the evidences of ordinary perception, setting out an account of scientific theory that can cohere with them. 
	In the first part of this essay I go through some of the more clear-cut ways in which Berkeley anticipates Husserl and some of the latter’s successors. In the second part I lay out the criticisms that Husserl and these others make of Berkeley, and I also indicate what they hold in common in their alternatives. In the third and final part I consider some of the ways in which Berkeley can meet these criticisms, either readily or through certain qualifications, and I bring out his most significant contributions as a proto-phenomenologist. My ultimate aim is to show there are more than traces, as some commentators have put it, of the phenomenological attitude in Berkeley.​[4]​ In his efforts to save the appearances, he goes back to that world in which we live and breathe, if not quite have our being. 

I
Like the phenomenologists of the last century, Berkeley is acutely aware of the importance of language in our philosophical investigations. He claims that many parts of knowledge have been obscured by the abuse of words and by the ways of speech in which they are delivered. ‘We have first raised a dust,’ he remarks, ‘and then complain that we cannot see.’​[5]​ With thinkers positing hidden essences and material substrates beneath qualities, it has become difficult to see what meanings words really stand for - if they stand for them at all - and whether these meanings can be justified through perceptions. We must pay close attention, according to Berkeley, to the correct use of words in appropriate contexts. Only then can we avoid confusion and the creation of fictions, not to mention false principles.​[6]​ 
	Such close attention is necessary because of our increasing familiarity with the manifold functions of language as we grow up, functions too familiar to be appreciated. When we first come across certain names or descriptions as children, the particular objects or events to which they refer will be illustrated perceptually in many instances by obliging parents or guardians. As we advance in life, however, we hear and read ever more about things that are absent to us, yet we seem quite happy to make judgements about them without the benefit of the relevant sensory ideas or first hand perceptual evidences. All too readily, we place our trust in the authority of speakers and writers. Yet if we pay attention to the actual use of language, states Berkeley, we would realise that its major function is not reportage: 


[T]he communication of ideas marked by words is not the chief and only end of language, as is commonly supposed. There are other ends, as the raising of some passion, the exciting to or deterring from an action, the putting the mind in some particular disposition – to which the former is in many cases barely subservient, and sometimes entirely omitted, when these can be obtained without it, as I think does not unfrequently happen in the familiar use of language. I entreat the reader to reflect with himself, and see if it does not often happen, either in hearing or reading a discourse, that the passions of fear, love, hatred, admiration, and disdain, and the like, arise immediately in his mind upon the perception of certain words, without any ideas coming between… …general names are often used in the propriety of language without the speaker’s designing them for marks of ideas of his own, which he would have them raise in the mind of the hearer. Even proper names themselves do not seem always spoken with a design to bring into our view the ideas of those individuals that are supposed to be marked by them. For example, when a schoolman tells me “Aristotle hath said it,” all I conceive he means by it is to dispose me to embrace his opinion with the deference and submission which custom has annexed to that name.​[7]​

Since ordinary linguistic usage cannot be purged of these ends, we must be alert to their specific character in each case. Besides due caution, however, Berkeley enjoins due charity in hearing and reading that will help us to discern innocent and productive ends.​[8]​ 
	Writing almost two hundred years later, Husserl follows Berkeley in wishing to avoid all those mistakes wrought by the misuse of language, and like him he wants to chase word-meanings back to original, first hand perceptions or intuitions. We may recall here Husserl’s oft–quoted contention that ‘we can absolutely not rest content with ‘mere words,’ i.e. with a merely symbolic understanding of words….[m]eanings inspired only by remote, confused, inauthentic intuitions – if by any intuitions at all – are not enough: we must go back to the ‘things themselves.’’​[9]​ Like Berkeley, Husserl is attentive to the uses that we make of words, and to the importance of pinning down the contexts of these uses so as to isolate the possible meanings and ranges of meanings of the relevant terms.​[10]​ 
	Like Berkeley also, Husserl is deeply concerned by the degree to which we depend on so-called reportage in our adult lives. The less time and opportunity that we have to check things for ourselves – and we usually have comparatively little of either in the course of the working week - the greater the swathes of our lived experiences that fall prey to what he calls ‘the seduction of language,’ in which information is taken at face value, with reading and conversation being dominated by repeated and untested associations. Attentive to the sheer volume of print delivered to us by the mass-media in contemporary Western nations, Husserl points to our tendency to accept passively what we have read, with what we have scanned in the daily newspaper straightaway and imperceptibly becoming our opinion.​[11]​
	Berkeley’s influence on the phenomenologists is most explicit on the issue of primary and secondary qualities. Some of his predecessors, including Descartes and Locke, held that primary qualities are those ones that are really out there in things, independently of the perceiving subject. Such mathematically determinable qualities like extension, figure and size are invariant, and they appear exactly as they really are. Secondary qualities like colour, smell and taste, by contrast, are not really as they appear to us. They are intrinsically variable and always relative to the subject. Colours, for example, vary according to the light. The drape that is golden in the freshness of the morning will take on greyness in the dusk. On this account, our only reliable access to things is through their primary qualities, qualities that are present in the microscopic atoms or corpuscles that go to make up the said things. 
	Berkeley criticized this thesis, arguing that we cannot know any primary qualities by themselves. We cannot have any sensation or idea of extension without bringing in colour, just as we cannot have any idea of a colour that is not extended. Our ideas of figure and motion also presuppose colour, and in these cases more than one colour. A figure must contrast in colour to its background in order to be identified in the first place, and for us to have an idea of its movement. The point is that we need so-called secondary qualities like colour to arrive at the primary qualities like extension, figure and motion. The supposedly objective qualities cannot be reached without the supposedly subjective ones. We cannot then maintain that primary qualities have a higher reality outside the perceiving subject.​[12]​ 
	The defender of primary qualities could retort that the best evidence for their objectivity is their invariability. Thus the figure and size of an object are always the same. But Berkeley attacks this claim as well. Figure varies according to the perceiver’s situation, that is, according his or her angle and nearness, and can also vary from perceiver to perceiver. As for the idea of size, it also varies with distance, and between larger and smaller people. We can of course have a common measure, and state that something is a yard or three feet or thirty-six inches long, but we are then considering it according to combinations of ideas that we as perceivers have applied to it. Figure and size, furthermore, are relative to temperature - something that is heated can lose its shape and expand. There is no true shape or size at a certain temperature any more than there is a true colour in a certain light. The conclusion to the critique of the primary and secondary quality distinction is that primary qualities are just as variable and subject relative as secondary ones. There is no good reason for saying that primary qualities are out there unmarked by the contributions of the mind.​[13]​ 
	Husserl agrees that there are no purely ‘objective’ qualities that remain after the role of the subject is taken away. Both primary and secondary qualities, on his account, are dependent parts or ‘moments’ of thing-perception. They are not independent parts or pieces.​[14]​ And he regards Berkeley, along with Hume, as the thinker who shook dogmatic objectivism to its foundations.​[15]​ An extreme version of naturalism, objectivism does not just hold that we are mere parts of the natural world. It maintains that consciousness is reducible to a true world of independent material objects that will eventually be explained fully by natural science. These objects lie behind our everyday perceptions, which are given a derivative and illusory character. The Berkeleian critique is also taken up by Merleau-Ponty, who gives extensive attention to the thesis that primary qualities are objective and invariable units of sensation. He does this as part of his wider project of returning to the realm of ordinary experience outlined by Husserl, a realm that is no longer slighted as one of mere appearance.​[16]​ 
	It is well known that Berkeley does not wish to reduce the perceptual world to my ideas or presentations alone. Ideas of sensation may be subjective, but are not dependent on me as finite subject. For one thing, these sensory ideas always show a steadiness, order and coherence that cannot be attributed to my own resources. They hang together without gaps or contradictions, and it is not in my power to choose which ones will present themselves to me when I open my eyes or use any of my other senses. And all of those objects that are there for me before I close my eyes are still there after I open them. Common sense suggests that they have not popped in and out of existence. Berkeley’s conclusion is that the order and endurance of my sensory perceptions or ideas of sensation is due to God, who perceives the totality of ideas when they are not being perceived by any finite beings. They are still mind dependent, but they are not dependent on particular human minds like mine.​[17]​ 
	What is not so well known, though pointed out by Herman Philipse, is that Husserl in his transcendental period advances a view strikingly similar to Berkeley’s.​[18]​ Husserl too finds an order in the flux of empirical appearances, and he states that this provides a rational ground for believing in the existence of a divine being. Such a being would be beyond the world and the transcendental, constituting consciousness common to human beings. By contrast with Berkeley, Husserl’s overriding concern is with constitutive syntheses, with the contribution that the finite transcendental subject makes to the meaning of the world. He sets aside the question of God’s existence as a distraction from this concern. God is a transcendency that has to be ‘placed within parentheses,’ that is to say, silhouetted and brought forward as a Being whose meaning for finite consciousness (like that of every other being) requires its own explication, whether or not that Being actually exists ‘out there.’ But in spite of this, Husserl goes quite a distance with Berkeley in affirming the rationality of divine idealism.​[19]​ 
	The later Husserl also converges with the Irishman in refusing to accept the existence of an external actuality that is intrinsically incapable of being perceived. Berkeley makes it quite clear that his rejection of matter does not apply to bodies, which we see and touch, and which offer resistance to us. In these perceptible respects, he is quite certain of matter’s existence.​[20]​ All that he dismisses is the idea of a matter that would support qualities without possessing any determinations in and of itself. Such an occult material would be nothing but ‘a stupid, thoughtless Somewhat.’​[21]​ When we turn to the transcendental phenomenology of Husserl, we find that he for his own part takes as nonsensical the idea of any being ‘lying outside the universe of possible consciousness, possible knowledge, possible evidence.’​[22]​ 

II
Phenomenologists from Heidegger onwards have disputed Husserl’s appeal to the rationality of divine idealism, and they would be more sceptical again towards Berkeley’s harder ontological variant, affirmed as existent and not merely assigned a rational weight.​[23]​ The latter’s critique of primary qualities as taken up by Husserl and Merleau-Ponty would be more proximate to their concern with descriptive faithfulness. But there are also aspects of Berkeley’s thought that would invite opprobrium from the phenomenological movement in general, from Husserl as well as his successors. They would all of them maintain, I think, that Berkeley goes wrong on our ability to grasp abstract general ideas, on our perception of worldly things, on the transcendence of these things, and on the perception of other people. 
	It is Berkeley’s contention that abstraction into generality or universality is impossible. I cannot conceive of colour in general without perceiving or remembering a particular colour. I cannot conceive of figure in general without thinking of a particular figure. I cannot, for example, think of triangularity in general without the image of a triangle that is isosceles or equilateral or right-angled. There is no triangularity that is all of these figures and yet none of them. All such ideas are particular, and ultimately we possess nothing but particular ideas.​[24]​ Now an immediate retort to Berkeley’s critique is that it seems to made human conceptualisation and linguistic communication impossible. If I remark that I saw a little red house in the park yesterday, my words surely invoke in the listener an idea that can be applied to the little house in his or her imagination. The redness seems to be an abstract and general idea that is being predicated of the imagined particular. 
Berkeley answers this retort by noting that he does not deny general ideas, only general ideas abstracted from particulars. He explains this as follows. When I think of redness, I am really taking the idea of a particular red thing and making it into a sign or a representation of other things that resemble it. This is what is meant by a general idea. In my ordinary use of language I annex the representation to a term like ‘red’ and give it this general application. The particular colour in thought is bound up with the simple expression that is a linguistic exemplar, an example standing for the totality of red things. Generality is a function of thought and language rather than an abstract conception. We have nothing beyond names for particular ideas that we happen to be using in a general way.​[25]​ 
	Husserl’s initial objection to Berkeley’s critique is that he falls prey to our natural tendency to turn from logical phenomena to whatever is perceptually palpable. He conflates meanings with images or pictures, and collapses the former into the latter. This introduces the difficulty, common to all nominalisms, of doing justice to the different meanings of names that we encounter in their actual use. If the meanings of names were only the particular images that illustrate them, then the particular objects of these images would be all that we meant by those names, and every name would be an equivocal proper name. The distinction between a general or common name and a proper name would be lost. There would be no generality in language, since we would always mean what is individual alone.​[26]​ 
The Berkeleian claim that a particular colour or shape represents everything like it is itself open to the charge of circularity. Husserl observes that the job of representing the totality of similar qualities that is carried out by a particular idea could just as well be performed by another particular idea. Light red is as good as dark red, and the isosceles triangle is as good as the equilateral one, which fits in with the letter of Berkeley’s account. But the thought of representation first arises from the reflection that each particular idea is equivalent in respect of this function. Whichever one has been chosen, any other one could replace it. This thought of representation therefore presupposes the general concept of similarity that it is designed to replace. The particulars are grasped through what is common to all, which is why each is known as a possible representative of all of them.​[27]​
We must of course start with particular images to get to certain meanings, for example those of colour and triangle. Husserl is happy to concede that images are a foothold for understanding, with some of them having an intimate relation to their meanings and often accompanying the latter. Yet images can only illustrate or represent their meanings adequately in the simplest of cases. Descartes already recognised the difference between imagining and understanding, noting that we can understand perfectly the meaning of a chiliagon or thousand-sided figure without being able to picture it adequately. This also applies to concrete existents like people, cities and landscapes. Their meanings clearly transcend those memories and imaginative pictures that we try to construct in our lived experience.​[28]​ 
Berkeley makes his account more plausible by omitting such complicated objects. And there are further cases adduced by Husserl where the understanding of meaning operates without illustrative images or particulars evoked by symbols. Thus the mathematician can readily comprehend a work of high abstraction. He or she does not experience the slightest trace of accompanying images that have anything to do with the objects of that work. The same happens in our experiences of reading other types of text, where we come across expressions within sentences like ‘culture,’ ‘religion,’ ‘science’ ‘art’ and so forth. We do not experience a succession of images evoked by each of these terms. The Berkeleian might here appeal to unconscious or unnoticed images, but this would seem to be something of a strained defence, and does not establish that the images would be adequate ones.​[29]​
	Berkeley’s account of the particulars that give rise to empirical things is no less contentious than his dismissal of abstraction. He is quite clear that we build up objects like apples, trees and books from bundles or collections of ideas of sensation. We notice, in the first example, that a certain colour, taste, smell, figure and consistency always go together, and we come to account these as making up one thing, signified by the name apple.​[30]​ Phenomenologists in general take issue with this claim that the basic particulars of sense experience are bundles of qualities like colours, sounds and shapes. Husserl and his successors hold that such presentations could never amount to something meaningful through the mere fact of coming together. A consciousness that did not interpret sensations could entertain the ones that we do, but would experience no trees or barking dogs or apples.​[31]​ 
	Further violence is done to our everyday perceptual world, claims Husserl, when Berkeley reduces bodily things to the complexes of sense data through which they appear, passing over these actualities and the intentionality or directedness of consciousness.​[32]​ For the phenomenologist, the objects of ordinary, naïve experience are the things themselves, given as meaningful wholes rather than as isolated qualities. Seeing, for instance, is always already interpretative, a seeing-as. Hence we do not see a green colour and a round shape, but the round green apple in the one blow. So also with hearing - we do not just hear successive tones, but the singer’s song. The sensations are animated from the outset, meaning being given with them instead of being plastered onto them afterwards. We do not see or hear our sensations, but have them. Our immediate directedness is to this or that object by way of the sensations, which are not the targets of our regard.​[33]​ We can certainly focus on shades and tones, but these are derivative abstractions from the original objects. As Heidegger remarks, it takes a very artificial frame of mind to see bare colours or hear bare sounds.​[34]​ 
	On the phenomenological account, the sense of a worldly object as being transcendent to consciousness is ineliminable. Every such object is given in person, and never as an image or picture. Yet I can only see it partially, under some of its aspects. Other aspects will always remain hidden. If I bring the back of a thing into view, for example, I lose its front, so there is a constant interplay of loss and gain, of absence and presence, in perception.​[35]​ And there is always the possibility of a further aspect telling me something new about the object. Even an aspect currently in view can reveal further riches when I come closer.​[36]​ The sense of the object’s transcendence, of its being beyond the subject, is derived in large part from the fact that perception can never capture it fully. The gaze of the perceiver can never exhaust it, either in what he or she is currently seeing or in what he or she may come to see.​[37]​ 
	Though I cannot exhaust a single thing, Husserl notes that some of them are more obliging than others when I see them without shifting position. Carousels and aquarium fish turn around to reveal many of their external aspects, if not their inner parts. But I only know that other extended things have sides and backs, and therefore depth, from moving around them previously. In so doing I have had kinaesthetic experiences, sensations of movement of my whole body and not just my eyes. There is a functional dependence between kinaesthetic experiences and thing perception.​[38]​ And the motility of my body is part of my horizon of expectations in perception. I read in the hidden aspects of a thing as co-present with its visible aspect, as possible to perceive if I change my position, which presupposes the sense that I can do so, or at least could do so given the right conditions.​[39]​ 
	If Berkeley goes wrong on physical things, he is still further from ordinary experience on the perception of the other, where this term denotes a person or an alter ego. Everything that we perceive, on his view, is no more than a sign or effect of divine power: 


We may even assert that the existence of God is far more evidently perceived than the existence of men; because the effects of Nature are infinitely more numerous than those ascribed to human agents. There is not any one mark that denotes a man, or effect produced by him, which does not more strongly evince the being of that Spirit who is the Author of Nature. For, it is evident that in affecting other persons the will of man has no other object than barely the motion of the limbs of his body; but that such a motion should be attended by, or excite any idea in the mind of another, depends wholly on the will of the Creator. He alone it is who, “upholding all things by the word of His power,” maintains that intercourse between spirits whereby they are able to perceive the existence of each other.​[40]​

On such a story, I do not enjoy rich or wide-ranging signs of another finite consciousness. Only narrow assemblages of ideas denote particular human minds. In The Principles, Berkeley is quite adamant that I do not see a person that moves, perceives, and thinks as I do. All that I am given is the limited collection of ideas that directs me to think that there is a distinct principle of thought and motion like mine, one that accompanies the collection and is represented by it. Only through rational inference can I posit the other mind. No feeling is involved in the process, since feeling lets me comprehend my own existence alone.​[41]​ 
	In a well-known section of Being and Time, Heidegger contends that my existence is always already a being-with-others, or being-with. I encounter them just as they are, as the suppliers, colleagues and siblings I am already among. They are not perceived as present-at-hand bodies from which subjective mental states have to be inferred.​[42]​ Husserl had already claimed that in ordinary experience, we see consciousness out there in the other’s body. Another mind does not lie behind appearances like a ghost in a machine. Every body is filled with soul, such that I see the person walking, dancing or raging.​[43]​ To see another body, in short, is not to see the sign or indication of a person. When Husserl attempts to uncover the sense of another as other subject or alter ego, he remarks that the immediate apprehension of another person has already done its work. What is closed off from me is not the Other’s consciousness, but that consciousness as it is lived from the Other’s perspective.​[44]​ The Cartesian mistake, taken up in all its fullness by Berkeley, is to confuse this first person perspective with a supposed consciousness that is completely private. 
	There is a further objection to Berkeley’s account that phenomenologists might make, and one that is actually made by J.S. Woolhouse. The latter observes that I take the things of common sense to endure outside their being perceived by me, but I also take them as public, as objects of actual and possible perceptions by others. The publicity of things may also be presumed to be a characteristic of divine perception. Yet Berkeley fails to explain publicity in accord with common sense, and seems unable to do so.​[45]​ Like Woolhouse, Husserl and his successors are adamant that the everyday things of the world have the sense of being available to all, as does the world itself.​[46]​ Husserl takes the transcendence and mutual availability of the thing so seriously that he writes these into God’s own experience. Even God must experience perspectivally, not surveying a thing panoptically from all possible perspectives. If the object did not transcend the divine perceiver, it would not be genuinely and universally transcendent, but only transcendent to us, and this because we are finite perceivers.​[47]​ 
	The phenomenological approach set out by Husserl and developed by Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty endeavours to return to the world of public, common sense objects, whilst purging it of naturalistic and objectivistic suppositions. The task is to explicate the original sense of the world for us, which philosophy can uncover but never alter.​[48]​ Husserl himself describes the real world as the one that we are in when we live together, talk, love and act. It includes the things that are immediately experienced as useful and beautiful; coal, hammers, vases, paintings and the like. His position is that there are no ‘mere things’ devoid of value in our everyday experience. The notion of a naked material object that exists in itself apart from a community of interested, involved perceivers is a theoretical construction. It ensues from the naïve immersion in the world that makes these perceivers oblivious to the synthetic accomplishments of consciousness that let sense and then theory emerge.​[49]​ 

III
Some of the foregoing elements of Berkeley’s philosophy may be open to qualifications. Such endeavours might not accomplish enough to make him count as a proto-phenomenologist, but could at least make his ordinary perceptual world converge more closely with that of the later thinkers. Now his critique of abstract general ideas would not appear to be a ready candidate for qualification. Neither would his bundle-theory of perception, nor his claim that God’s existence is perceived more evidently than other human beings. There are elements in Berkeley’s early descriptions of experience and in his subsequent refinements, however, which turn out to be more recalcitrant to phenomenological critique. These indicate that he can be remarkably faithful to the world we perceive and to ourselves as perceivers. 
	For one thing, Berkeley does not pass over the role of the living and motile body in human perception. In an Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision, he rejects the thesis that we originally perceive the distance of things visually. The science of optics suggests that the further away an object is from the perceiver, the more nearly parallel are the rays of light. Berkeley does not dispute this, but notes that I do not see these rays, which would be lines directed end-wise to the eyes in any event. I am only aware of colours and eye-movements, with the interval between my pupils lessening as an object approaches, and widening as it recedes. Awareness of distance involves certain sensations in and of my eyes.​[50]​ But this does not hold for someone blind from birth who comes to see. He or she would not correlate eye-movement with distance and size and shape, so everything would be equally near or far and effectively homogeneous, be it the cube or the square or the tabletop.​[51]​ 
	Berkeley’s conclusion in the Essay is that distance is read off with magnitude and figure, which are always tangible. When I see a certain object at a certain distance, I am leaning on a former experience of walking so many paces and being affected by such and such ideas of touch. What I see indicates a distance measured by the motion of my body, which is itself experienced in its activity, and a size and figure measured by the tactile experiences of the object. As I have grown up, I have imperceptibly attributed the data of tactile experiences to the visible ideas that typically accompany them. The latter are signs of distance, magnitude and figure that do not provide them directly.​[52]​ Translating this account into phenomenological language, the motility of my living body with its possible kinaesthetic experiences contributes to the horizon of perceptual sense. And it is made explicit that it is the resistance offered to my limbs that first warrants the existence of bodies.​[53]​
	Berkeley also goes quite a distance, so to speak, towards an appreciation of transcendence in his awareness that aspects of reality can go beyond me in manifold ways. It is the utmost folly and presumption, he believes, to pretend to determine what ideas will come to be imprinted by the Supreme Spirit on ‘my own few, stinted, narrow inlets of perception.’ For all that he knows, there may be innumerable ideas or sensations, as different ‘from all that I have perceived, as colours are from sounds.’​[54]​ Though these ideas would have to perceived by God and be determinate, they can in no way be predicted from my resources. They may only be possible presentations for different created beings with other forms of sensibility, other inlets of perception that are passive and receptive in their own manners. 
	In the Three Dialogues, moreover, Berkeley’s Philonous asks Hylas to look towards the fields and groves and springs, and beyond these to the lustre of the stars and the vault of the heavens. ‘[N]either sense nor imagination are big enough,’ he remarks, ‘to comprehend the boundless extent with all its glittering furniture.’ Should the mind extend each power to its utmost reach, he adds, ‘there still stands out a surplusage immeasurable,’ beyond expression and beyond thought.​[55]​ And it turns out that Berkeley as Philonous, showing the glittering furniture to another, does in fact hold that they things within it are publicly available. Different people, he states, can perceive the same collection of qualities that make up one thing, and will only differ on the names given to the collection, or on the different elements within it that they choose to pick out and name. Since we do not perceive anything behind these common ideas, states Berkeley, any difficulty that might be discerned with regard to divine causality applies equally to the causality of the materialist.​[56]​ 
It can also be argued that Berkeley does not reduce the object to a panoptical view that God might entertain. Things or ideas of sense may depend on God, but Berkeley contends that these ideas perceived by God are not conveyed to him by sense.​[57]​ At second glance, then, he does not seem so vulnerable to the actual objection of Woolhouse and the possible one of Husserl et al, unless it can be shown that ontological dependence entails a perception that encompasses the thing panoptically and destroys its transcendence. But if the preceding theses have undergone qualification from Berkeley himself, there are other ones stamped indelibly with the suppositions of Cartesianism and classical empiricism. We are reminded again of the inaccessibility of others and the bundle theory of perception. These must surely prevent us from reading too much of a later movement into the earlier thinker. 
	If we look at Berkeley’s Alciphron, however, we find that he also refines his earlier account of apprehending others. In the Fourth Dialogue of this late work, he begins by holding fast to his initial view that, in the body of a man, there are very few ‘visible signs and tokens as suggest and infer the being of that invisible thinking principle or soul.’​[58]​ But he then allows that these are ‘certain proofs’ of a living soul, albeit not of a thinking and reasonable one. And he says that, on re-examination, ‘I have found that nothing so much convinces me of the existence of another person as his speaking to me. It is my hearing you talk that, in strict and philosophical truth, is to me the best argument of your being.’​[59]​ It is not just the sound of speech that convinces me of this, he adds, but the use that is made of sensible signs which have no necessary connections with the things signified, signs which inform, entertain and direct me about things distant and future as well as proximate and present. 
	As I remarked above, attending to such refinements does not quite establish that Berkeley is a proto-phenomenologist. It is my contention that he really emerges as such in his anticipation of the phenomenological attitude of describing things faithfully, even if he still goes wrong in his bundle-theory of experience. We saw that he wants to dispel linguistic confusion. This is in the service of returning to our presentations, laid bare to our view.​[60]​ Like the later theorists, he sets out to preserve the phenomena of everyday naïve living. Such an endeavour to respect originary givenness is announced in ringing terms, and sets a high standard for subsequent phenomenological description. The correct principles of philosophy, he tells us, will not deprive us of any things in nature. Whatever we see, feel, and touch, taste and smell will remain as secure as before, and as real as before. That these things really exist will not be questioned in the least. All that is rejected is the notion of causal, mechanical explanation in terms of a matter devoid of determinations, which has no more meaning in philosophy than it has in common discourse. ‘And in doing of this,’ states Berkeley, ‘there is no damage done to the rest of mankind, whom I dare say, will never miss it.’​[61]​
	Like the later theorists, he refuses to relegate any empirical phenomena to a derivative and illusory realm. Pointing to the beauty of nature and the heavens, his Philonous enquires what treatment those philosophers deserve who would deprive these noble and delightful scenes of all reality. ‘How should those principles be entertained,’ he wonders, ‘that lead us to think all the visible beauty of the creation a false imaginary glare?’​[62]​ Elsewhere, Berkeley makes it obvious that this passage is not merely rhapsodic. He asserts that there is a rerum natura, and that the distinction between realities and chimeras retains its full force.​[63]​ I mentioned above that Berkeley does not want to reduce the perceptual world to my ideas alone. He attributes their order and endurance apart from my actual and possible perceptions to God. Yet he does not stop here. His final account may involve a divine idealism, yet it also involves an empirical realism, for his attack on Locke’s representationalism does not involve retreating to a veil of ideas. It involves the complete rejection of the representationalist schema. 
	Let us assume that our presentations or ideas of sensation are not the real things, but only images or copies. If we do this, notes Berkeley, it is impossible to know how far our ideas represent the originals, or if they represent them at all. Some of them may represent accurately, but we cannot distinguish these from false copies.​[64]​ Berkeley realises that indirect or representationalist realism, which Kant would later call transcendental realism, leads to scepticism, which Kant would call empirical idealism. It has no criterion of perceptual truth. The Berkeleian alternative is direct realism, or empirical realism. The truth of things is not to be found between each appearance and some reality behind it. Rather it is to be found between the various appearances themselves, which give us the realities. Whenever an appearance is wrong, its falsity is shown, and only shown, by another appearance.​[65]​ 
	Once we abandon the idea of a secret hinterland behind our ideas, according to Berkeley, scepticism and its possibility is banished, for there is nothing left to be sceptical about.​[66]​ We will be reminded here of Husserl and Heidegger as well as Kant. They too reject scepticism and indirect realism, and their common view is that external experience alone can verify or falsify external experience, with the phenomena giving us the realities as opposed to semblances.​[67]​ For Berkeley, furthermore, the true world is not just that of the fields and springs and heavens, but of the fires and wood and iron that we encounter and use in everyday living.​[68]​ His version of the natural attitude, or natural atmosphere of our lives, is scarcely more naturalistic than the variants outlined in Ideas II and Being and Time. We see that human beings, in his words, ‘perform all the offices of life as comfortably and conveniently, as if they really knew the things they are conversant about.’​[69]​
	Berkeley’s other major contribution as a proto-phenomenologist consists in his realisation of how we may reject at its roots what Husserl calls objectivism. This is the aforementioned project of explaining reality through natural science and showing the superficial, inferior character of everyday experience. Berkeley knows that rejecting the conception of an indeterminate material substrate of perceptible qualities is not sufficient to save the appearances, for it could be retorted that the objectivist is not committed to such a conception. He or she can hold that the true beings are mechanical forces like gravity and attraction. These lie underneath our perceptions, like other and as yet undiscovered features of matter that may also be quite determinate. It is necessary for Berkeley to give a different explanation of the entities of scientific theory and practice that can explain their remarkable success, whilst maintaining a credible trust in the deliverances of ordinary perception. 
	Berkeley’s alternative explanation is worked out in final form in De Motu. He contends that mechanical forces and processes and the like have their proper place as components of theories that tell us which ideas or presentations will follow on other ones. They count as eminently rational constructions, not as empirical actualities: 


‘Force,’ ‘gravity,’ ‘attraction,’ and words of this sort are useful for reasonings and computations concerning motion and bodies in motion, but not for understanding the simple nature of motion itself, or for designating so many distinct qualities…These things serve mechanics and computation: but it is one thing to serve computation and mathematical demonstration, and another to exhibit the nature of things… …just as geometers for the sake of their discipline contrive many things which they themselves can neither describe, nor find in the nature of things, for just the same reason the mechanician employs certain abstract and general words, and imagines in bodies force, action, attraction solicitation, etc. which are exceedingly useful in theories and propositions, as also in computations concerning motion, even if in the very truth of things and in bodies actually existing they are sought in vain, no less than those things geometers frame by abstraction.​[70]​

Put another way, a word like ‘attraction’ does not denote a mechanical process out there, but a part of a hypothetical, mathematical model of reality. Berkeley contends that we must remain attentive to the difference between mathematical hypotheses and the nature of things. Successful hypotheses are useful fictions rather than mirrors of existents that underlie everyday appearances. Scientific ‘theories’ and their components are bare predictive devices, and one such theory only replaces another one because it predicts the course of appearances more accurately.​[71]​ As Karl Popper has shown in some detail, Berkeley provides the first instrumentalist view of the status of scientific entities. He combines a rejection of scientific realism and essentialism with an empirical realism concerning ordinary perception.​[72]​ 
	In his last work, The Crisis of European Sciences, Husserl explains scientific entities in a very similar way, and to the same end of validating the primacy of everyday perceptual experience. The problem with the dogmatic objectivism of natural science, he tells us, is that it has thrown a garb over ideas over the life-world, our world of ordinary lived experience. And it has taken as true being what is in fact only a method, an explanatory framework. The technique that is physics does not give us reality, merely a means or instrument for prediction that will be ideally extended to infinity.​[73]​ Husserl’s antidote is a return inquiry that will trace modern science back to its origins in the geometry and mathematics of antiquity. It will show how these sciences began in pre-scientific techniques of measuring and surveying, and these in their turn in primitive activities of polishing, levelling and sharpening. His aim is to show that scientific theories are parasitic on the ordinary, first level experiences that they dismiss.​[74]​ 
	This view was also adopted by Merleau-Ponty.​[75]​ It is not of course indisputable, for one might defend the reliability of ordinary perceptual objects whilst remaining a scientific realist, arguing that the hypothetical entities of natural science approximate to genuine ones. These actual entities should be affirmed as the ultimate targets of ever-improving modes of scientific description that need not denigrate the objects of ordinary perception, since the latter could still be taken as having a character irreducible to anything behind or beneath them. They could retain an objectivity all of their own, so to speak. In such a non-reductive realism, they would count as the major qualitative components of ‘what it is like’ to have the world of a conscious human being.​[76]​ The realm that is lost by the instrumentalist would be saved, even if problems like the freedom of the will were left over. 
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